BOARD CHARACTERISTICS AND INDUSTRY SPECIALIST AUDITOR : THE MODERATING ROLE OF CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP
Keywords:Board characteristics, industry specialist auditor, concentrated ownership in Turkey firms
This study illustrates the impact of concentrated ownership on the monitoring role of board of directors in term of high quality audit proxy by industry specialist auditor. The integration of agency theory and resource dependency theory reflects that board has different incentives and abilities to monitor management. The analyses of Turkish listed firms indicates that board characteristic complement high quality audit when ownership concentration at low levels. When ownership concentration is at high level, this is not the case- proposing that there is substitution influence between concentrated ownership and board characteristics in term of the demand for high quality audit.
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